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Abstract:  
One of the oldest federalist systems, Germany offers itself as a case study for long-term 
developments in federalism. Drawing on a burgeoning literature on institutional continuity and 
change we investigate the development of a key institution of German federalism, the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) from the foundation of the German Reich until today. Counter to claims that 
institutional change occurs mainly during “critical junctures,” the Federal Council has shown 
remarkable resilience: It persisted through World War I and the 1919 revolution and the writing 
of the centralist Weimar constitution. Dismantled in 1934, it returned in 1949 after years of 
dictatorship, war, and military occupation. Counter to an emphasis on institutional stability in 
“settled” times in earlier literature, the role of the Bundesrat has changed significantly over the 
last 60 years. Initially representing the interests of federal states, it has gradually developed into a 
powerful second chamber dominated by national-level 
politics. 
 
                                                 
1 We thank the participants in the Darmstadt workshop, and especially Fritz Scharpf, Jörg Broschek, and Arthur 
Benz, for extremely helpful comments on this chapter. An earlier version of this paper was presented at Syracuse 
University, where comments by Pablo Beramendi in particular proved invaluable to improving the overall argument. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The study of federalism has undergone something of a renaissance in the last two decades (Erk 
and Swenden 2010; Hueglin and Fenna 2006). Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe have been especially important in rekindling interest, but a 
more general trend toward political decentralization involving devolution of political 
responsibilities and sometimes the “activation” of previously dormant territorially based 
representation has also contributed to the current wave of interest in the effects of federalism on 
policy and politics generally (Gibson 2004). 
 
One important stream of scholarship has focused on the stability of democratic federalism, asking 
the question of what makes federalism robust (or “self-enforcing”) over time (e.g., Bednar, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn 2001; Bednar 2009). In line with the themes at the heart of this volume, 
this chapter seeks to go beyond the question of stability or breakdown to provide insight into how 
federal institutions evolve over time. As one of the oldest federal systems, Germany is a case that 
allows us to analyze the development of federal institutions over a much longer stretch of time 
than is possible with more newly minted varieties. 
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We focus special attention on the German Federal Council (the Bundesrat), a cornerstone of 
German federalism from the beginning, and an institution that has exhibited remarkable resilience 
over the past 140 years. When a unified German state was formed in 1871 by several independent 
princedoms, the Bundesrat was a central component in the constitution. This upper parliamentary 
chamber consisted of emissaries from all state governments, weighted by, but not proportional to 
states’ size. The imperial government broke down when Germany was defeated in World War I, 
and after a revolutionary period, the Weimar constitution entered into force. The upper chamber 
devised for Germany’s first democracy (renamed Reichsrat) again consisted of emissaries from 
all state governments, weighted by, but not proportional to states’ size. Finally, following 
Germany’s capitulation in World War II, after 12 years of dictatorship and three years of 
occupation, a new constitution was crafted in 1948 and became the Basic Law that governs 
Germany until today. It establishes an upper chamber (called, again, the Bundesrat) that consists 
of emissaries from all state governments, weighted by, but not proportional to states’ size.  
 
The resilience of the Bundesrat through otherwise order-shattering events in Germany’s recent 
history presents an intriguing puzzle when viewed against the backdrop of “punctuated 
equilibrium” models that tend to dominate the literature on institutional change in comparative 
politics. Such models encourage us to think about institutional development as characterized by 
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long periods of stable institutional reproduction punctuated periodically by moments of intense 
institutional reconfiguration. As such, this literature has us mostly looking for “big” institutional 
changes in historic breakpoints, and for stable institutional reproduction the rest of the time. 
Whereas institutions are seen to be mostly constraining under conditions of stability, “critical 
juncture” moments are thought to ease the usual constraints on action and open the door to 
significant institutional transformation (e.g., Katznelson 2003). 
 
One puzzle, then, around which the following analysis is organized is to explain the surprising 
durability of the Bundesrat through massive historical break points following Germany’s defeat 
and reconstitution after the first and second world wars. These episodes would surely qualify as 
“critical junctures” by almost any definition, and they were moments in which the actors who 
were politically empowered by the transitions in fact preferred very different and more 
centralizing constellations. In both episodes, the Bundesrat figured centrally in conflicts between 
centralizers and advocates of strong states rights, and although the balance sometimes shifted, the 
Bundesrat survived. 
 
However, there is a second puzzle as well, and in some ways it is the mirror image of the first. 
Here the challenge is to explain significant changes in the role and functions of the Bundesrat 
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since 1949, a period that most observers would almost certainly code as “settled” rather than 
“unsettled” times, to use Ann Swidler’s terms (Swidler 1986). However, the operation of German 
federalism has in fact changed significantly in this period. The Federal Republic of Germany was 
re-founded after World War II as a “unitary federal state” (Hesse 1962), with all the ambiguities 
the phrase itself suggests. Since then German federalism has increasingly evolved into what 
Scharpf characterizes as a “joint decision system” prone to political paralysis and stalemate 
(Scharpf 2005). Changes in the role and functions of the Bundesrat figure prominently in these 
developments. Repeatedly defended against more unitarist impulses as a mechanism to safeguard 
state rights, the Bundesrat survived, ironically, only to become an instrument for the unitarization 
of power at the expense of state autonomy. The “functional conversion” of the Bundesrat – from 
a “states rights” chamber to a powerful player in national decision-making -- was not anticipated 
by the institution’s designers and defenders (Neunreither 1959: 713). The shift was also not 
accomplished in a single well-defined moment of institutional (re) design; this outcome, rather, 
emerged incrementally through a series of discrete political shifts and small but consequential 
judicial decisions in the post-WWII period that cumulated to produce a very significant 
reconfiguration of institutional arrangements in the absence of any single “break point.”   
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This chapter examines the evolution of German federalism and the Bundesrat in both aspects -- 
formal institutional survival through historic break points and gradual functional change beneath 
the surface of apparent institutional continuity– applying insights from recent writing in historical 
institutionalism to the study of federalism.  
 
6.2 The Evolution of German Federalism: An Overview 
To frame the discussion to follow, this section provides a schematic overview of the evolution of 
German federalism over the past century and a half. We can capture the relevant changes with 
reference to a theoretical framework proposed by Gibson and Falleti (Gibson and Falleti 2004).  
Gibson and Falleti distinguish two dimensions along which federal systems vary. The first 
dimension concerns the balance of power between national and state (provincial) governments, 
and it is captured by the distinction between “centralized” versus “peripheralized” variants of 
federalism. In strongly centralized systems power is concentrated at the national level (i.e., the 
center dominates the states), while in peripheralized systems state governments exercise 
considerable powers vis-à-vis the center. A second dimension concerns relations among the states 
themselves, and involves the distinction between “hegemonic” and “pluralistic” varieties of 
federalism (Gibson and Faletti 2004: 227). Hegemonic federalism depicts a situation in which a 
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single state or province is able to exercise disproportionate influence over the others; in 
pluralistic varieties of federalism, power is more evenly dispersed among the various states. 
 
Combining these two dimensions produces the analytic space shown in figure 1, with which we 
can track changes in German federalism over time. The original design of the Imperial 
Constitution of 1871 made Germany an almost textbook example of “hegemonic peripheralized” 
federalism, combining as it did significant decentralized powers for individual states but with one 
state (Prussia) clearly dominant. The Weimar period marked a shift to a more centralized but still 
hegemonic version of federalism; power became more centralized as the national government 
assumed control over fiscal matters, but plans to reconfigure the states (and dismantle Prussia) 
failed. In the post World War II period, the redrawing of the national and state maps (eliminating 
Prussia) produced a more plural variety of federalism, which by design at least also provided for 
very significant state autonomy (peripheralized and plural, therefore, in Gibson and Falleti’s 
scheme). Over time, however, subtle but cumulatively profound changes moved Germany 
strongly in the direction of greater unitarization, as the autonomy of state legislatures shrank in 
tandem with an increase in the power of the Federal chamber at the national level. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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The following sections examine these developments in turn, paying particular attention to 
changes in the role and functions of the Bundesrat as a central player – and field of conflict -- in 
the evolution of German federalism. 
 
6.3 Founding Institutions and the Origins of the Bundesrat 
The origins of German federalism and of the Bundesrat are inextricably bound up in the birth of 
the German nation-state itself.  The story of the founding of a unified German empire in 1870/71 
cannot be recounted here, but its main contours are broadly familiar. The Prussian monarch 
Wilhelm I (and his chief minister, Otto von Bismarck) orchestrated annexations of key territories 
in the wake of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 to pave the way for the founding of the North 
German Confederation and ultimately – in the wake of the Franco Prussian war (1870-71) – to 
bring the key states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria into a unified nation state. The new 
German Reich was born federal -- a “union of twenty five German states of various sizes and 
forms of government” (Craig 1980: 39). The core institutions of the new German nation-state 
were the national executive (the emperor and his chancellor), a national parliament (Reichstag) 
elected by universal male suffrage and secret ballot, and a federal council (Bundesrat) composed 
of appointed delegates representing the governments of the constituent states. 
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Prussia was clearly the dominant force,2 but the federal design made Prussian hegemony in the 
unified Reich more palatable to the other states by evoking the structure of the delegate council 
that provided coordination during the years of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund, 1815-
1866), when representatives of autonomous states had convened as equals (Lehmbruch 2000: 78-
79; 2002: 41). Along with arrangements guaranteeing the states very significant levels of fiscal 
autonomy, 3 the establishment of a council in which state governments would be directly 
represented in national decision-making soothed some of the concerns of the more independent 
states, as it underlined the federative character of the new government.4 In fact, each of the state 
delegations to the Bundesrat had its own embassy and its members enjoyed diplomatic status. In 
the subsequent functioning of the Reich as well, large states were regularly consulted before the 
introduction of important legislation (Lehmbruch 2000: 80; 2002: 44). 
                                                 
2  The Prussian king became emperor and his chief minister the first Chancellor.  Moreover, within the Bundesrat, 
Prussia controlled 17 out of a total of 58 seats. 
3   In fact, at its founding, the German Reich was almost entirely dependent on the states for financing (Nipperdey 
1986; Ullmann 2005). 
4   Other special deals for key states that initially resisted absorption into a unified German state (in particular 
Bavaria and Württemberg) were negotiated to bring them in – e.g., exemption from taxes on beer and spirits, and 
independent postal, railroad and telegraph services (Nipperdey 1992). 
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Beyond its role in facilitating unification, the Bundesrat played a key part in stabilizing the 
authoritarian imperial government in a context marked by considerable pressures for democratic 
opening emanating both from neighboring countries and from within Germany itself (Nipperdey 
1992). The democratically elected lower house (Reichstag) provided a kind of fig leaf legitimacy 
but real power rested with the Bundesrat, which was dominated by Prussia, and whose state 
legislature was notoriously undemocratic.5 More precisely, and as Otto Pflanze has put it, the 
Bundesrat was a key component in an elaborate balancing act that allowed Bismarck to leverage 
multiple potentially disorganizing tendencies. “Centralistic and particularistic institutions were to 
be played off against each other. Pressure would be met by counter pressure: the nation against 
the dynasties, the confederation against Prussia, Reichstag against Bundesrat, parliament against 
parliament, centralism against particularism, the centripetal against the centrifugal…” (Pflanze 
1990: 346-48). 
 
                                                 
5  Prussia’s three-tiered voting system guaranteed aristocratic dominance, and within the Bundesrat the Prussian 
delegation was able to block any measure they deemed against their interests. 
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Given its history and role in the German imperial state, the Bundesrat was strongly associated 
with authoritarianism.6 Deeply anti-democratic in its composition, the institution represented a 
“cartel of princes and bureaucrats”(Lehmbruch 2002: 37) who actively inhibited the development 
and exercise of democracy. The opposition Social Democrats understandably committed 
themselves in this period to dismantling the Bundesrat and establishing a unitary system of 
government. As Engels put it in 1891, it would be impossible “to revolutionize society while 
there are [state] reservation rights,” and noted that “the proletariat can only use the form of the 
one and indivisible republic” (Engels 1990[1891]: 227-28). 
 
6.4 Politics in Critical Junctures: The limits to institutional redesign 
Social Democrats got their chance in 1918 when defeat in World War I and the collapse of 
empire abruptly thrust them into positions of power. A classic case of a critical juncture, the 
revolution had upended power relations in Germany. The country’s constitution was re-written 
from scratch under the influence of a democratic revolution led by social democrats. The 
country’s governing council designated Hugo Preuß, a left-liberal professor of law, as an under-
                                                 
6  Very different from the sanguine views of federalism in some of the contemporary literature, German federalism in 
this period clearly operated as a bastion of reactionary forces—similar in this sense to federalism in the nineteenth 
(and into the twentieth) century in the United States and some Latin American cases today (Gibson 2005). 
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secretary of state, and commissioned him to draw up a draft constitution. Although Preuß was not 
himself a social democrat (he was associated instead with the liberal German Democratic Party, 
Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP) (Rürup 1972), he shared a preference for a more unitary 
form of government.   
 
Specifically, Preuß favored a “decentralized unitary state” with power concentrated at the 
national level and where states would survive but in a completely reconfigured form. Preuß 
regarded the existing states as relicts from an authoritarian past (Apelt 1946: 60). He envisioned 
redrawing the map to create eight wholly new states (above all: more equal in size) and 
subordinated to the powers of the central government. Given the dominance of Social Democrats 
at both the national level and in state governments7 and the strong preference for a unitary system 
of government on the part of those charged with crafting a new constitution, one might have 
expected a complete break with traditional institutional arrangements. 
 
Yet the refounding exhibits a more complex mix of continuities and changes (Schultz 1987: 198). 
When the Weimar constitution was signed into law on August 11, 1919, it not only left traditional 
                                                 
7 As Schulz notes, one year after the toppling of the monarchy, Social Democrats were the majority party in thirteen 
of Germany’s states, including in the three largest states (Schultz 1987: 198). 
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state boundaries intact, but also established the Reichsrat, an institution strikingly similar in its 
composition and design to the imperial Bundesrat. As before, state representatives to the Council 
would not be elected but would instead be direct emissaries of state governments.8 Even though 
the center of power shifted sharply toward the national assembly (Reichstag) (Schultz 1987: 104), 
the Reichsrat retained some significant rights, specified in Articles 60-67, 69 and 74 of the 
Weimar Constitution (see also Craig 1980: 419). The constitution stipulated that every legislative 
initiative by the government had to be presented to the Reichsrat. If the Reichsrat did not consent, 
its dissenting opinion needed to be presented together with the proposal to the Reichstag. 
Moreover, the Reichsrat could object to any law passed by the Reichstag, and overruling such 
objections required either a 2/3 majority in the Reichstag or a majority in a plebiscite called by 
the president. 
 
Prussia was a main target of Preuß’s reform ambitions, and the failure of his plan to break up the 
state by redrawing state boundaries meant that Prussia survived the transition to democracy. 
Decision-making within the new government was more centralized, a consequence above all of 
fiscal reforms (the Erzberger reforms) that freed the central government from dependence on the 
states for financing. And although some limits were placed on Prussian influence in the 
                                                 
8  Each state would be granted one vote per million inhabitants, with a minimum of one vote per state.  
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Reichsrat,9 Prussia would continue to loom relatively large in German politics. Invoking Gibson 
and Falleti (2004) again, one could speak of a transition to a more centralized version of a 
hegemonic federal regime – the hegemon, Prussia, survived the transition although the center of 
power (especially in financial matters) shifted to the national government. 
 
For present purposes the resilience of the Bundesrat model (direct state representation at the 
national level) is remarkable. Despite the close association of the Bundesrat with authoritarianism 
and the unequivocal desire on the part of the founding Weimar government for a more unitary 
structure, the constitution not only allowed the council of state ministers to survive but handed it 
significant veto power in the national legislative process. What was behind this outcome? An 
examination of the politics in the turbulent period between 1918 and 1919 is instructive for what 
it teaches us about the possibilities for wholesale institutional redesign in critical junctures.  
 
Federalism in the SPD 
                                                 
9  In a provision designed to limit Prussian influence, no state could have more than 2/5 of the votes in the Reichsrat 
(Prussia had about 60% of the population). For the Prussian territory, half of the delegates would represent the 
provinces and half the state of Prussia itself. 
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Politics of the SPD, one of the bigger parties supporting centralization, is particularly instructive. 
In the nineteenth century Germany’s Social Democratic Party had developed a reputation as the 
country’s most strictly organized, centralized and disciplined party, a legacy of the original 
organizational design but also the result of decades of semi-clandestine activity under the anti 
socialist laws (Nipperdey 1961: 386; Michels 1911, 1966[1925]). But the reputation is at odds 
with the reality, since the party in fact was more decentralized and diverse (organizationally as 
well as ideologically) than commonly thought. Political conditions in Germany’s various states 
diverged considerably in the imperial period. The Left was vigorously repressed in Prussia but in 
some of the southern and southwestern states the Social Democratic Party enjoyed more freedom 
to organize and to contest elections. 
 
Local and state level party leaders adapted their strategies to local conditions. In Prussia, 
repression and constraints on organization – extending well beyond the expiration of the anti-
socialist laws in 1890 --- fuelled a radical ideology. There, anti-combination laws prevented state-
wide assemblies (the first state party conference in Prussia did not take place until 1905), and 
electoral laws were skewed to systematically under-represent the Left. However in other German 
states, including Baden, Hessen, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony, a more liberal climate 
prevailed. In these states, social democrats organized and contested elections, achieving 
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representation in state governments by 1900 (Miller and Potthoff 1986; Schultz 1987; von 
Freyberg 1975). In these states, party leaders regularly faced important choices about whether to 
align themselves with bourgeois parties in electoral coalitions and frequently traded their support 
on various government bills for more democratic electoral laws. 
 
The diversity of conditions under which the SPD operated in different states set the scene for 
consequential battles within the party of how much autonomy regional leaders ought to enjoy.10 
Party elites in the more liberal states chafed under what they considered the overly doctrinaire 
line of (Prussian) central party leaders. Already in 1891, Georg von Vollmar, the powerful 
reformist leader of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party, had rankled national leaders by 
suggesting that the party should cooperate with the dominant bourgeois powers on military issues 
and policies toward independent farmers. Such ideas were considered treasonous in some party 
circles and the issue of centralization versus state autonomy in the party was a repeated subject of 
debate at party congresses in the early 1900s.  
 
At the 1905 congress the southern German states sponsored a proposal for the federalization of 
the party structure itself, precipitating a heated debate over party organization. Although the 
                                                 
10 On the internal politics of the party, see especially (Nipperdey 1961: 387-88; and von Freyberg 1975). 
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southerners’ proposal for decentralization was defeated at that congress, the issue did not go 
away. It reached a head in 1908 when southern delegations were charged with breach of 
discipline for having voted for the national budget, and some of the hardliners at party 
headquarters (e.g., Clara Zetkin) sought to have them expelled.11 But unity trumped discipline 
and no sanctions were imposed. While the party congress reaffirmed its commitment to 
centralization, there nonetheless remained significant space for autonomy even if the southerners 
were never successful in their bid to get the party reorganized officially around federal principles. 
 
These divisions did not vanish in the transition to democracy after WWI; indeed, in the rocky 
period following Germany’s capitulation, the emerging leadership in southern states – led by 
Bavaria -- put all their efforts into securing state autonomy. Within the Bavarian state party, 
reformist and revolutionary elements locked horns on all conceivable programmatic issues, but 
they spoke with one voice on the question of state autonomy and federalism. Erhard Auer, 
Vollmar’s protégé and, like his mentor, a dedicated reformist, was firmly committed to state 
autonomy. But so was the Bavarian revolutionary Kurt Eisner, who wanted the same outcome but 
for very different reasons, namely to avoid subordination to the more moderate party elite that 
                                                 
11  The national party explicitly rejected supporting the national budget on principle, since the budget gave the 
government resources to pursue its authoritarian policies. 
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had in the meantime assumed power in Berlin (Nipperdey 1961: 387-90; Schultz 1987; see also 
Mehringer 1992). Bavaria was not alone, either. Already in December 1918 the southern German 
states had held a “conference of states” (Staatenkonferenz) to establish a common position to 
bring into national discussions. 
 
State governments were up and running much earlier than the national government. Separate 
revolutions in different regions gave power to self-confident and independent minded (also now, 
democratic) state governments (Peukert 1987: 46). Most of these were quickly able to solidify 
their power (Apelt 1946: 40). Partly this was a function of high continuity in local and state 
bureaucracies, as new democratic governments “slipped into the empty hull” of the previous state 
structures (Schultz 1987: 104), leaving the administration intact and largely unchanged. 
Moreover, in the context of extreme national upheaval, the country’s president Friedrich Ebert 
needed regional elites to restore order and re-establish authority. Just as Bismarck had needed 
state elites to solidify authoritarianism, so too did national political elites in the early years of the 
democratic Weimar Republic need them to stabilize democracy, and for this compromises were 
necessary. 
 
The role of Länder bureaucrats 
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When state representatives received Preuß’s constitutional draft on January 20th 1919, they 
vehemently opposed it as too unitarist. The states were invited to a joint conference with the 
federal government on January 25th 1919. Participating in this conference on behalf of the states 
were not only their revolutionary governments (mostly SPD or USPD), but also large numbers of 
bureaucrats, many of whom had already been part of the imperial Bundesrat (Jasper 1992: 125f). 
The tone of the meeting has been characterized as “more ancien regime than revolution,” and 
many scholars regard the convening of the conference as a definite decision for a more federal 
solution (Rose 1964: 22; Apelt 1946: 177). 
 
Delegates to the conference put up ferocious resistance to the idea of restructuring the states. 
Even southern elites argued against ideas that had been floated to divide Prussia into a number of 
smaller states, not out of loyalty to Prussia but because they viewed this as a strategy to weaken 
the power of the states generally. State representatives successfully argued for the establishment 
of a permanent council of states (Staatenausschuss) to accompany the constitutional process. The 
federal government would put all of its recommendations before the council (Schultz 1987: 187 
and passim). In all areas where agreement with the states could not be reached, both positions 
were to be presented to the constitutional convention, though only in questions of the integrity of 
state territory were the states to have an outright veto (Apelt 1946: 68). 
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The states’ representatives in the council would not be elected, but rather, direct emissaries of 
state governments -- thus mirroring the past Bundesrat and foreshadowing the future Reichsrat. 
Once convened, the council was also successful in convincing the government to agree to pass a 
preliminary constitution that would serve as a legal basis during the negotiations of the 
constitutional assembly. On Feb 6, 1919, a “preliminary law governing central-state power” 
[Vorläufiges Gesetz über die Reichsgewalt], was passed by the national assembly 
(Nationalversammlung) without significant debate. This short document predetermined many of 
the later structures of government, including the existence of a second chamber based on direct 
representation of state governments at the national level (Jasper 1992: 127). 
 
In sum, the result of this first episode in institutional redesign was heavily laced with elements 
from the previous imperial model (Craig 1980), an instance of what Slater and Simmons might 
call a “critical antecedent” (Slater and Simmons 2010). The new constitution involved some 
diminution of state power, but much survived the rupture, and the Weimar constitution would 
likely have been more federalist still had Bavaria (the most vociferous proponent of state 
autonomy) not sunk into chaos. The crucial Erzberger reforms regulating state finance centralized 
21 
taxation authority. However, efforts to redraw state boundaries and reconfigure German 
federalism in a more profound way were defeated. 
  
The Bundesrat thus survived a transition that had transferred power to a national political elite 
previously committed to its elimination. The reason has in large part to do with the fact that 
federalist thinking had long infiltrated the party itself, and even radical socialists sought refuge in 
federal institutions (in this case, paradoxically, to buffer themselves from the moderates in power 
at the national level). For its part, the beleaguered national government saw the newly founded 
democratic state governments as allies in its efforts to institutionalize democratic rule. And, as 
during the imperial period, radically diverging political constellations in different states during 
the rest of the Weimar years kept the discussion of deeper reforms to the Bundesrat and to 
Germany’s federal structure off the agenda. 
  
6.5 Reinstituting Federalism: the Bundesrat in the Federal Republic 
Federal institutions were completely dismantled in the years of National Socialism, but re-
emerged after the Second World War. When the Federal Republic of Germany was founded out 
of the three zones occupied by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the allies 
placed certain limits on the nature of the constitution, outlined in the so called “Frankfurt 
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Documents.” These were to be the basis of the constitution (named the “Basic Law” or 
Grundgesetz for its supposed provisional nature) crafted by the Parliamentary Council convening 
in Bonn. The allies were unambiguous in demanding that Germany be reconstituted as a federal 
state but as Scharpf and Lehmbruch both emphasize, they confronted powerful actors in Germany 
who preferred a more centralized constellation (Lehmbruch 2002: 59; Scharpf 2009: 18f).12 Since 
a completely unitary system was ruled out by the occupying powers, contests focused on more 
versus less centralized models. 
 
Some of the most important conflicts were played out over the composition and role of the 
Bundesrat. Regionally based parties and parts of Christian Democratic Union (CDU), as well as 
politicians from the southern states were especially interested in preserving the traditional 
Bundesrat model (Lehmbruch 2002: 7, 59; Lambrecht 1975: 28). By contrast, the Social 
                                                 
12  Although a full treatment is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth mentioning that the allies also insisted on 
a rather decentralized system of dual taxation in which indirect taxes would go to the national government and direct 
taxes to the states. In order to avoid conflicts, the constitution of 1949 included only preliminary rules on fiscal 
federalism. Elsewhere, (Broschek 2010, 2011; Renzsch 1991) have analyzed the ways in which incremental 
expansion of vertical revenue sharing and “horizontal” (inter-state) equalization schemes evolved step by step 
between 1955 and 1969, at which point a major overhaul of the tax system explicitly reestablished a system which, 
by requiring joint decisions in legislation, increased the power of the Bundesrat.  
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Democratic Party and the liberal Free Democratic Party preferred a popularly elected senate like 
in the United States. They were joined in this position by a significant fraction in the CDU, 
including its leader Konrad Adenauer, as well as the country’s future first president Theodor 
Heuss (Morsey 1974: 67; also Morsey 2000; 1972). 
 
In the end the Bundesrat system (of state-government delegates) prevailed, a decision widely 
seen as a victory of federalist forces (Neunreither 1959; Lambrecht 1975; Merkl 1965; 
Lehmbruch 2002: 63). The conservative state premier of Bavaria, Hans Ehard, who was deeply 
involved in the deliberations, declared the reinstitution of the Bundesrat “a decisive victory for 
the federalist spirit” (cited in Morsey 1974: 77).13 After the extreme centralization of power 
                                                 
13 The final product looked as follows: The Bundesrat consists of delegates from the state governments. Each state 
has at least three representatives, states with more than two million inhabitants have four representatives, states with 
more than six million inhabitants five  (Art. 50, 2). All laws that affect Länder powers, in particular those containing 
directives to state administrations (Art. 84) or changing joint taxes  require Bundesrat assent. (Art. 84) If a law 
requires Bundesrat assent and does not find a majority in the Bundesrat, either house can call for the convocation of 
the mediation committee, in which Bundestag and Bundesrat are represented equally (Art. 77, 2). If a law requires 
Bundesrat assent and the mediation committee does not find a compromise, the law fails. The Bundesrat can object 
within two weeks to any law, even those that fall under the sole jurisdiction of the federal parliament (Bundestag), 
and request that the mediation committee be convened. In this case, the Bundestag can overrule an objection of the 
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under Hitler the proponents of the Bundesrat model saw the institution as central to the project of 
“stabiliz[ing] the rights of the states against federal powers” (Neunreither 1959: 729). 
 
The revival of the Bundesrat model was anything but foreordained. With the exception of 
Bavaria, Hamburg and Bremen,14 the German states did not reemerge after the war in their 
historic form. Most of the states that would send delegates to the upper chamber were wholly 
new constructions, their boundaries above all a function of the occupation zones. However, and 
as in the early Weimar years, state governments had been able to reconstitute themselves before 
the national government was up and running. As in the previous transition, Prime Ministers of the 
Länder convened a Parliamentary Council through which they could collectively exert influence 
in discussions over constitutional redesign -- another critical antecedent à la Slater and Simmons 
(Slater and Simmons 2010).15 As Karl Arnold, Prime Minister of North-Rhine Westphalia and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Bundesrat with the votes of a majority of its members, except where the Bundesrat objects with a 2/3 majority, in 
which case the Bundestag needs a 2/3 majority to overrule the objection (Art. 77, 1-4). 
14 Also Saxony, but it was in the East, therefore destined to become part of the communist German Democratic 
Republic (DDR). 
15 The members of the council were then elected by the state Parliaments, but a month before the Parliamentary 
council started debate, scholars and politicians had convened at Herrenchiemsee to draft working proposals for the 
constitution. 
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the first president of the Bundesrat argued in his inaugural address: “The Länder, represented by 
their governments, are powers within the Federal Republic of Germany that cannot be ignored. 
They were the first to re-emerge after the total defeat” (cited in Rapp 1974: 23). 
 
In principle, and as before, the national leadership of the SPD was less enamored of strong state 
rights. However, for them the Bundesrat model was part of a compromise that would clearly 
subordinate this institution to the popularly elected Bundestag in the legislative process, 
something that would have been hard to attain with the Senate model (Morsey 1974: 74f). The 
reinstitution of the Bundesrat was thus in an important sense a “common carrier” of diverse and 
even conflicting objects (Schickler 2001). States’ rights advocates believed the institution would 
serve as a bulwark to preserve state autonomy, and unitarists saw in it a less formidable 
competitor for national legislative power than a popularly elected Senate. The following section 
explores why both sides were wrong. 
 
6.6 Limits to Stability: The Changing Nature of Post-War German Federalism 
The role played by the Bundesrat in the Federal Republic would have disappointed its federalist 
and unitarist supporters in about equal measure, for over time it developed into an institution that, 
contrary to the federalists, has not preserved the autonomy of the individual state legislatures, 
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and, contrary to the unitarists, has at the same time developed into a (sometimes disruptive) veto 
player in national-decision making. Oeter (1998: 264-65) characterizes the transformation of the 
Bundesrat as follows: “originally intended by its proponents as a ‘federal brake’ [on central 
power] along the lines of the Bundesrat in Bismarck’s constitution…the Bundesrat in fact 
developed into a promoter of unitarization” (Oeter 1998: 264-65). 
 
The division of powers between central government and states that was worked out in the Bonn 
constitution was from the start somewhat ambiguous, as indeed the term “unitary federal state” 
(Hesse 1962) itself implies. As noted above, the state governments were in place before the 
founding of the Federal Republic and the allies “insisted on a federal solution” and “also made 
sure that the Länder would dominate the design and adoption of the constitution” (Scharpf 2005). 
At the same time, however, the idea of a unitary state had taken hold in the population in general 
and in the national political parties in particular, so that as Fritz Scharpf notes, the Basic Law that 
was ultimately ratified in 1949 was also infused with a strong strain of unitarism. 
 
In some ways tensions were built into the constitution itself. Article 72 set out the basic terms of 
the relationship between central and state legislative jurisdictions–concurrent rights, reserved 
competencies, and conditions under which federal legislation trumped state rights – though the 
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general trend in the early years was toward interpreting these in ways that enhanced federal 
dominance. However, the constitution also clearly gave states primary responsibility for 
administering federal law, building on Germany’s strong tradition of decentralized administration 
(Neunreither 1959: 713-14). In light of this, Article 84 (1) of the German Basic Law stipulated 
that federal laws that require execution and administration through the states must secure their 
consent via the Bundesrat. This provision, originally seen as innocuous, in fact opened the door 
for what became a “surprising expansion” of the Bundesrat’s involvement in legislative matters 
(Neunreither 1959: 718).16 
 
The increase in the Bundesrat’s role and influence in national decision making was unanticipated, 
and in its aggregate effect, unwanted by all sides as well. The change was not abrupt but 
proceeded gradually as more and more legislation came to be interpreted as requiring Bundesrat 
approval. While initially there was some ambiguity as to whether Bundesrat approval was 
required only for the administrative sections of proposed laws, political developments and 
expansive interpretations of the law by the Constitutional Court drove an increase in the number 
of laws requiring Bundesrat assent. Figure 2 documents the growth of laws subject to Bundesrat 
approval after 1949. 
                                                 
16  The definitive accounts are by Lehmbruch and by Scharpf, on whom we rely here. 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
As the influence of the Bundesrat in national politics grew, the autonomous legislative powers of 
the state legislatures declined, or as Oeter puts it, “the states’ gradually diminishing independent 
powers were replaced with increasing participation [through the Bundesrat] in the exercise of 
power at the national level” (Oeter 1998: 265). The paradox is that the Bundesrat, established to 
safeguard state autonomy and widely conceived as a victory for federalists, was in this way 
effectively transformed from a “states rights” chamber into a vehicle for the unitarization of 
power in Bonn/Berlin. The result, as one observer put it, is that today’s Bundesrat is a far cry 
from the one envisioned by the founders (Neunreither 1959: 713). 
 
The ‘Double Movement’ of German Federalism 
The evolution of German federalism and, with that, of the role and functions of the Bundesrat 
involved a double movement – an increase in the power of the federal government over state 
governments in legislative decision-making, and a concomitant increase in the role and power of 
the Bundesrat in national-level politics. This section deals with each of these aspects in turn. 
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Judicial actions and political dynamics both operated from early on to reinforce the dominance of 
the central government over the states in legislative decision making. An important court decision 
(in 1952), for example, underscored the impact of Article 125 of the Basic Law, which stipulated 
that all matters falling under concurrent legislation that had already been pre-empted by the 
federal level before 1949 would automatically be carried over into the Basic Law as federal 
competences. The court ruled that these matters would not be subject to state approval, in effect 
generating a barrier against decentralization in any of these areas (Oeter 1998: 202-206; Scharpf 
2009: 9). 
 
Legal rulings and political practice under Art 72,2 of the constitution also reinforced the general 
thrust toward federal dominance. This provision gave the central government the right to pass 
laws “if and to the extent that the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal 
territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the 
national interest.” The original intent of this clause (the so-called necessity clause or 
Bedürfnisklausel) under the occupation powers was to preserve significant residual powers for 
the states – i.e., the federal government could only take action required to equalize conditions. 
But in practice the clause was interpreted broadly to allow federal legislation in a wide range of 
areas. 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, state governments readily acceded to federal actions taken under the 
auspices of the “equalization” clause because economic conditions (above all, labor shortages) 
were driving costly competition between states on subsidies and public employee wages (Scharpf 
1999). In this context, states were willing to yield regulatory power to the federal government as 
a way of solving their own collective action problems. A similar dynamic took hold when the 
German federal government began to offer grants-in-aid to states in issue areas falling under their 
(states’) constitutional prerogative, such as education and health care. Frequently such grants 
came with some type of conditionality, e.g., that the states match federal funds. Nevertheless, 
states were in no position to turn down federal grants, even less so as their fiscal situation 
deteriorated in the first economic downturn of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Blair 1981: 224). 
 
When the “Grand” coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD came to power in 1966 it undertook a major 
overhaul of federal arrangements. However, what transpired to a very significant extent simply 
followed and codified political realities as these had developed over the previous decades. 
Longstanding areas of federal-state cooperation were formally written into the constitution as 
“joint tasks” (Art. 91), which are planned and financed jointly by state and federal governments. 
The constitutional basis for grants-in-aid was established by Article 104a,4, and some of the 
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fields where such financing had become prevalent (e.g., hospitals and education and training), 
were added to the list of concurrent powers (Art. 74. 13 and 19a) or defined as joint tasks under 
Article 91.17   
 
Since most of these new national-level regulations relied for their execution and implementation 
on decentralized administration, state bureaucracies were positively affected by these 
developments, as demonstrated by the steady upward trend of state expenditures as a share of 
total expenditures since 1950 (figure 3). State administration, in turn, triggered Article 84 (1) in 
which laws requiring state administration required Bundesrat assent (Scharpf, Reissert, and 
Schnabel 1976; Lehmbruch 1976). In this sense, the strengthening of Bundesrat power in national 
decision making and of state administrative power were mutually reinforcing; Oeter even speaks 
of a dialectical relationship between the two (Hesse 1962; Oeter 1998: 265). The Bundesrat (and 
the state governments represented in it) thus retained significant power, even if state legislatures 
who did not have a voice in these proceedings, found themselves excluded from an increasing 
number of policy fields (Schmalenbach 1998: 44f). 
                                                 
17 As Behnke and Benz note, the trend since the 1980s has been in the other direction, with states trying to 
“decentralize powers and to push back federal interventions in affairs of Länder and local governments” (Behnke and 
Benz 2009: 224). 
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--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
Thus, the other side of the double movement of German federalism was the expansion of the role 
of the Bundesrat. In this case too the trend was partly driven by political developments but 
further reinforced by key court decisions. Of these, the most significant ruling was a 1958 
decision in response to several laws extending the federal price act. In this case the court ruled 
that Bundesrat approval was required in the law at issue, and it went on to render a very 
expansive interpretation of Article 84 (1) that held that it was not just the administrative 
provisions of a proposed law that required Bundesrat asset, but the entire act. The impact of this 
ruling, based on a “unity theory” [Einheitstheorie] of laws was not fully apparent until the 1970s 
when the Bundesrat and Bundestag were controlled by different political majorities. However, 
this decision translated into a significant increase of power of the Bundesrat, as “the 
administrative character of a single clause was sufficient to give the Bundesrat an absolute veto 
over the whole law” (Blair 1981: 96).18 
                                                 
18 In the following years, some of the court’s rulings appear to moderate the sweeping statements of the earlier 
ruling, without however touching the general principles it had established.  In any event, the federal government was 
reluctant to challenge the Bundesrat’s (quite frequent) declaration of a law as requiring assent, since it often needed 
the states’ cooperation in executing the law in question (Blair 1981: 101). 
33 
  
Party Politics and the Bundesrat 
During the crafting of the constitution, proponents of both Senate and Bundesrat models 
suggested that the institution would be above party politics, a moderating influence on the more 
partisan Bundestag. However, as Lehmbruch has convincingly argued, these views rested on 
what turned out to be faulty assumptions both about partisan politics and the limited role the 
Bundesrat was expected to play (Lehmbruch 1976: 71). By 1961 the powers of the Bundesrat had 
grown beyond the intent of the designers and the German party system was increasingly 
characterized by a high degree of polarization between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The specter 
of divided government – with Bundestag and Bundesrat controlled by different “poles” in the 
political spectrum became a distinct possibility. 
 
The first period of “divided government” in 1969 under the SPD/FDP coalition had the effect of 
pulling the Bundesrat into national party politics, a problem that became recurrent and acutely 
visible thereafter (Lehmbruch 1976; Burkhart 2008).19 Initially, the position of the small but 
                                                 
19 Though less visibly, party (instead of state) representation in the Bundesrat became an issue before the onset of 
divided government after 1969. According to Lehmbruch, it was not unusual for the national CDU party to pressure 
its prime ministers on important Bundesrat decisions (Lehmbruch 1976: 126). Already in 1954, the CDU in Hessen 
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pivotal FDP in several state coalitions with the CDU was able to moderate attempts by the CDU 
to use the Bundesrat as a tool for party politics. But as the CDU was able to win absolute 
majorities in an increasing number of states, it was able to make good on the announcement of 
CDU-leader Kiesinger that the Bundesrat would be “an important instrument for the opposition” 
(cited in Lehmbruch 1976: 133). The CDU/CSU’s opposition did not take the form of explicit 
obstruction, but the opposition had a very strong position in negotiating favorable outcomes for 
laws requiring Bundesrat consent.20 
 
One consequence of these developments was that questions of states’ rights were increasingly 
subordinated to or translated into partisan disputes and played out in conflicts between competing 
majorities in the Bundesrat and Bundestag.21 Moreover, state prime ministers increasingly used 
                                                                                                                                                              
campaigned with a slogan that emphasized the importance for the composition of the Bundesrat of the party’s 
winning the state parliament. 
20 In 1994, a constitutional amendment was passed requiring the Federal Constitutional Court to decide on matters of 
concurrent powers, and after 2000 a number of court rulings produced a somewhat more restrictive interpretation of 
the “necessity clause,” thus restricting federal jurisdiction.  But this did not change the basic dynamics described 
here. 
21 Under Gerhard Schröder’s Red/Green coalition, legislation that was opposed by a CDU-CSU dominated Bundesrat 
included health care reform, fiscal reform, welfare reform, and the reform of citizenship laws. 
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the platform afforded them as members of the Bundesrat to position themselves as opposition 
leaders. This “tradition” was begun by Helmut Kohl, then Prime Minister in Rhineland Palatinate 
in 1975, when, addressing the Bundestag as a representative of the Bundesrat, he stated that he 
was “speaking for my friends in the German CDU/CSU” (cited in Lehmbruch 1976: 141). The 
role of the Bundesrat as a stage for national politics has been further emphasized by the 
importance of state party organizations for the recruitment of national politicians. Angela Merkel 
was not only the first Chancellor since Ludwig Erhard (1963-1966), who had not been state 
prime minister,22 but was one of only two major party candidates since Erhard without such 
experience.  
 
The role of party politics, party organization, and divided government has thus led the Bundesrat 
further and further away from a “states rights” chamber. When Gerhard Schröder called for new 
elections in 2005, it was not on the basis of defeat in the lower house (Bundestag), but rather on 
the occasion of the CDU/CSU winning a 2/3 majority in the Bundesrat – thus guaranteeing the 
opposition the ability to block any law (not just those requiring assent) passed by the governing 
coalition. Efforts to ease the political deadlock caused by these dynamics through constitutional 
                                                 
22 Or the functional equivalent of ruling mayor of an independent city, such as Brandt, Schmidt, and Vogel, mayors 
of Berlin, Berlin, and Hamburg respectively.  
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reform in 2006 produced very limited results (see especially Scharpf 2009; also Behnke and Benz 
2009).23 
 
6.7 Conclusion: Stability and Change in Federal Institutions  
 The case of the Bundesrat is instructive for what it can teach us about processes of institutional 
change in federal institutions and beyond. The literature in comparative politics often falls back 
on a punctuated equilibrium model of change that expects significant transformations mostly in 
“critical juncture” moments and institutional stability in periods of “normal politics.” What we 
observed for German federalism, however, is something like the opposite:  surprising stability 
through unsettled times, and significant changes in periods of “normal politics” and even under 
the guise of considerable formal institutional stability. 
 
As we saw, the Bundesrat proved surprisingly resilient through successive episodes of dramatic 
political change, being reinvented or revived in the aftermath of historic ruptures following the 
first and second world wars. Since that time, however, the Bundesrat’s role in Germany’s system 
                                                 
23 For the specifics of the 2006 Reform see (Burkhart, Manow, and Ziblatt 2008).  Behnke and Benz note that “the 
goal of significant disentanglement of competencies was not met, and the re-organization of the fiscal constitution 
was excluded altogether” (Behnke and Benz 2009: 223).  Most observers therefore doubt the results will have a 
significant impact. 
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of government has changed considerably and in ways that are deeply paradoxical – from a strong 
states’ right chamber to a powerful and sometimes disruptive player in national decision making. 
But what is crucial in the current context is that many of the most significant shifts in this 
transformation occurred outside of big break points through processes of incremental but 
cumulatively transformative change. 
 
As noted in the introduction to this volume, most of the existing literature that takes federal 
institutions as the dependent variable focuses either on issues of constitutional design or of the 
stability of federal institutions. Regarding design, our study suggests that even the most dramatic 
instances of historical ruptures do not necessarily allow for textbook re-design; many features 
survive these ruptures. Moreover, the political role of the Bundesrat (Reichsrat) hardly 
corresponded to the expectations of its designers, which in turn leads us to be sceptical about 
inferring the effects of institutions from their formal design, or conversely, of reading the intent 
of an institution’s designers off of the role the institution can later seen to be performing. 
 
Analyses of the stability of federal institutions do implicitly address institutional change -- as the 
absence of stability. But of course treating stability and change as polar opposites is clearly 
unsatisfactory. German federalism is indisputably stable on many important dimensions, and yet 
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formal institutional stability has not prevented significant change in the functions of the 
Bundesrat over the last sixty years. Indeed, as Behnke and Benz suggest, a certain degree of 
flexibility is sometimes even a precondition for the stability of federal structures (Behnke and 
Benz 2009).  
 
We have suggested studying the origins and development of federal institutions using insights 
from historical institutionalism. Following the work of Thelen (2004) and Pierson (2004), we 
emphasize the mechanisms of reproduction that keep institutions intact even through significant 
historical junctures as well as the importance of gradual changes in the form and functions of 
institutions over time. While until now the key works in historical institutionalism have 
concentrated on ‘softer’ institutions, mostly in the area of political economy (Hall 1986; Thelen 
2004), our study shows that some of these insights can be fruitfully applied to formal political 
institutions as well.  
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